http://www.incadat.com/ ref.: HC/E/CA 308 [21/12/1999; Court of Queen's Bench (Family Division) of Manitoba (Canada); First Instance] Mahler v. Mahler, 1999 A.C.W.S.J. 167730; 94 A.C.W.S. (3d) 313
COURT OF QUEEN'S BENCH OF MANITOBA (Family Division)
Little J.
21 December 1999
Docket : FD 99-01-56814 Winnipeg Centre
BETWEEN
PETITIONER,
- and -
G.M.
RESPONDENT
REASONS FOR JUDGMENT
_____________________
APPEARANCES:
Michael Paluk for the Petitioner
Janet Sigurdson For The Central Authority of the Province of Manitoba on behalf of Mr. M.
JUDGMENT: Little, J.: Mr. and Ms M. married in the state of New York
in 1992. In February 1999, they separated and signed a separation agreement.
They continued to reside in New York. The agreement says the parents have "joint
legal custody" of their two children, L and LL, with "physical custody with the
wife". In May, 1999, without Mr. M.'s knowledge or consent Ms M. brought the
children (then 6 years of age and 15 months, respectively) to Manitoba to reside
with her here.
Mr. M. applies under the Hague Convention for an order
returning the children to their habitual residence in the state of New York. The
Convention has two objects:
a)To secure the prompt return of children
wrongfully removed from a Contracting State, and
b)To ensure rights of
custody and access under the law of one Contracting State are respected in
another (Article 3).
Under the Convention, this court is required to
return the children forthwith if a wrongful removal has occurred (Article 12),
unless there is a "grave risk of harm", or they would otherwise be placed in an
"intolerable situation" (Article 13). If a grave risk of harm is established,
return of the children becomes discretionary, rather than mandatory.
The
issues raised are these:
a)Was there a wrongful removal of the children
in May 1999?
b)If so, will their return expose them to a grave risk of
harm or an intolerable situation?
c)If a risk exists, how might it be
managed or minimized?
FACTUAL BACKGROUND:
Mr. M. is a lifelong resident of New York State,
as were the children until they came to Manitoba. Ms M., originally from Lake
Manitoba First Nation in Manitoba, has lived in the United States since 1978
when she was placed for adoption as a teenager by the then Children's Aid
Society.
The separation agreement signed by the parties in February 1999
provides:
the parties have agreed to joint legal custody with physical custody with the wife and therefore the immediate care and supervision of the minor issue shall be with the mother. [emphasis added]
The agreement goes on to provide "visitation" is to be liberal, unrestricted
and "worked out between the parties". A series of mutual clauses then follows
affirming:
a)Neither will hinder the relationship with the other parent.
b)Each will notify the other of a change in address or phone number.
c)Each will consult on issues of health, education and welfare.
d)Both will cooperate to advance the children's health, emotional and
physical well being; affection for both parents and a sense of security.
There is no clause specifically providing for ultimate or final decision
making authority, but the separation agreement does say:
"any matters relative the custody and visitation of the minor issue as well as the support of the minor issue shall be referred to the Family Court of the State of New York, Chemung County".
After signing the agreement, the parties continued to see a marriage
counsellor to assist them with scheduling periods of care and control. Mr. M.'s
rebuttal affidavit (hence not responded to by Ms M.) alleges a shared custody
regime had been agreed to on or about May 1, 1999 whereby each of the parties
would have rotating one week periods of care and control. His first week under
that regime was to have begun on May 24, 1999, three days after she left the
jurisdiction with the children. While there is some discrepancy, even vagueness,
in the affidavits about the frequency or duration of Mr. M.'s contact with the
children, it is clear his contact was ongoing, and occurred with a degree of
frequency and predictability.
Some less essential facts are also worth
noting:
a)The parties, before and after the separation agreement, spoke
about a potential move to Canada, yet there is no specific reference to
"residency issues" in the separation agreement.
b)The agreement was
drawn by Ms M.'s lawyer who witnessed both parties' signatures. Mr. M. waived
counsel and acted on his own behalf.
c)After the separation agreement
was signed and Ms M. indicated that if she moved, it would be just with the
children, Mr. M. objected to any such move.
d)Ms M. did not tell Mr. M.
she was leaving.
e)Neither did she tell the babysitter. Indeed, she
reminded the babysitter that Mr. M. would be picking up the children on May 24.
It appears she left the jurisdiction on May 21st.
f)Ms M. never told the
school she would withdraw L from class.
g)Ms M. had by then advised her
employer she would not be returning to work.
h)Mr. M. learned from the
marriage counsellor one night before beginning his period of care and control
that the children "might not be available the next day".
i)Mr. M. acted
immediately, filing a missing persons' report, petitioning the court in New
York, and obtaining an order providing for temporary sole physical custody to
him within one day after learning of the departure.
j)The New York Court
has proceeded progressively through a series of court hearings and adjournments
from May 25th to October 21st (which is the last date for which evidence is
before this court). Ms M. has not participated in any of these proceedings, has
avoided or not cooperated with service and process, resulting ultimately in an
order she appear or a warrant would issue for her arrest in that jurisdiction.
k)Since May 1999, Mr. M.'s only contact with his children has been by
telephone.
WRONGFUL REMOVAL:
Article 3 of the Convention makes removal of
children wrongful if it is in breach of "rights of custody" under the law of the
state where the children habitually reside. Ms M. argues no wrongful removal has
occurred because there is no breach of a "custody right" under New York law. She
argues her right to "physical custody" and "immediate care and supervision" in
conjunction with the change of address provision comprises all of the "rights
relating to the care of the person of the child" within the meaning of Article 5
of the Convention. In short, what Mr. M. has is a right of "visitation" or
"access" and that is not enforceable under the Convention. She further argues
the requirement to consult on "health, education and welfare" given her physical
custody of the children ought to be interpreted to require nothing more than
that. Ultimate decisions on issues of residence, among other things, rest with
her because that is within the realm of authority conferred by the agreement and
is within the meaning of "physical custody".
I cannot agree. In the
leading case of Thomson v. Thomson , [1994] 6 R.F.L. 4(th) 290 (S.C.C.) � 322,
the Supreme Court of Canada interpreted the provisions of a Scottish court order
in the absence of evidence of its legal effect, "without aid, from general
principles and by analogy to Canadian law". Turning to this agreement, and as a
matter of simple interpretation, I cannot conclude that the document ought to be
construed in Ms M.'s favour, particularly given the circumstances of its
execution. Even if contra proferentem does not apply, I note the agreement does
not use the word "sole" or "primary" as a modifier to "physical custody". This
is a distinction made in the "chasing order" granted to Mr. M. by the New York
court after Ms M.'s departure - he was granted "temporary sole physical
custody". It is also a distinction in one of the two New York attorneys'
affidavits filed in these proceedings, where that attorney uses the word
"primary" to describe a relationship where a child resides for the majority of
time with one parent. Further, I take the reference to " immediate care" to be
nothing more than "day to day" care. It is equally as persuasive therefore to
argue that whatever rights of "physical custody" Ms M. has, they are something
less than "sole".
Neither am I persuaded the mutual change of address
clause gives Ms M. authority to change the habitual residence of her children.
While there may be a general right of the mother to determine residence within
the state of New York, itself, I am not persuaded she has authority to change
their country of residence, in the absence of more specific wording. Indeed, if
the matter of Ms M.'s possible relocation (with or without the children) or her
ultimate decision making was the topic of discussion between the parties, before
and after separation, why then is neither specifically reflected in the
agreement? To accept Ms M.'s interpretation is to render the words "joint legal
custody" practically meaningless at least as I understand the term under
Canadian or New York law.
A closer legal analysis does not assist Ms M.,
either. Article 5 of the Convention defines "rights of custody" as including
"rights relating to the care of the person of the child, and in
particular the right to determine the child's place of residence"
[emphasis added]. In essence, she insists that "physical custody" is synonymous
with "rights relating to the care of the person" and because of that the right
to determine residence is an included right. The case law is clear, however,
that the "right to determine residence" is a right divisible from "the right to
care for the child" (see Thomson supra � 320, para. 58). It follows therefore
that one need not always include the other.
In that context, I must now
look to the custody laws of New York. Counsel have provided me with affidavits
of two New York attorneys and the decision of the New York Supreme Court,
Appellate Division, in Trapp v. Trapp, 526 N.Y.S. (2nd) 95, 136 A.D.
2nd 178.
Mr. M. relies on his New York attorney's affidavit. Her affidavit deposes to
facts unlikely to be within the realm of her personal knowledge, and which ought
properly to have been presented as assumptions of fact upon which her opinion
was then based. In my view, affidavits deposing to the law of a foreign
jurisdiction may be of greater weight and assistance to the court if they come
from someone other than an attorney hired by one party to effect a specific
result.
The second attorney's affidavit is of more assistance. He
indicates "legal custody" and "physical custody" are each recognized by New York
law. The former deals with who makes the major decisions in the child's life
(e.g. religion, health). The latter involves actual physical placement of a
child with one or both parents. "Joint legal custody" provides each parent with
some say in major decisions. " Primary physical custody" indicates the child
resides with one parent for the majority of the time, while "joint physical
custody" is a shared or split placement between parents.
Turning now to
Trapp v. Trapp , ( supra ), the New York Appellate Court has this to say:
"Joint legal custody" gives both parents continuing rights and
responsibilities as they had during marriage to participate in the decisions
affecting their children. Day to day child rearing decisions are made by the
parent with whom the children are living, while decisions with respect to the
important issues such as religious training, education, medical care and
sometimes even less significant matters, such as discipline, diet and the choice
of a summer camp, are jointly made. (p. 98)
In Trapp , the rights
associated with "joint legal custody" are many, diverse and severable. In that
case, the court decided to give one parent decision-making authority on all but
two issues, because otherwise the court had become the "ultimate arbiter of
every fundamental child rearing issue" [emphasis added]. Nonetheless, the
court maintained joint decision making on matters involving religion and
citizenship "which form a profound part of a child's heritage and generally do
not require daily and immediate intervention by the caretaker parent".
In my view, residency is both fundamental and more akin to matters
concerning citizenship than to summer camp. What is more, the separation
agreement requires consultation on several matters considered by Trapp to be
more quotidian than religion and citizenship, or for that matter residency -
e.g. health, education and welfare. Accordingly, and in the absence of any
limitation in the M.s' agreement, I conclude, "residency" is otherwise included
in the bundle of rights associated with "joint legal custody" under New York
law.
Ms M.'s argument that "physical custody" is the equivalent of
"rights of care of the person" under the Hague Convention is an overreaching
interpretation. It presupposes the two concepts are synonymous. While physical
custody is clearly "a right of care of the person", I can not conclude it
encompasses all such rights of care. Simply put, Mr. M. has some rights to "care
of the person" when consultation is mandated on health, education and other
issues. Neither is a narrow interpretation of "custody rights" under the
Convention in keeping with the decision in Thomson , supra , (cf. W. (V) v. S.
(D) [1967] CR 108 (SCC).
"The right to determine residence" is a
divisible concept from "physical custody" or "the right to care of the person".
whether under the Convention or New York law. "Joint legal custody" under New
York law does create a "right of custody" within the meaning of the Hague
Convention and includes the right to determine residence. The father's rights
are therefore not ones of access only and there has accordingly been a wrongful
removal.
IS THERE A GRAVE RISK OF HARM?
The onus is on Ms M. to show her
children would be exposed to harm or otherwise placed in an intolerable
situation if returned. She has an evidentiary hurdle (that is proof on a balance
of probabilities) and a "gravity of risk" test to meet (see Thomson , supra ,
328, para. 80). "Best interests" considerations are not the test (see Thomson ,
supra and Hawke v. Gamble [1998] 43 R.F.L. (4th) 67 (B.C.S.C.)).
Ms M.
says Mr. M. is an alcoholic, was unreliable in meeting his support obligations,
and was physically and verbally abusive to her. When angry, he would "resort to
pushing ... spitting in [her] face ... nudging [her], pounding his chest,
kicking down doors and raising his voice and provoking [her] into altercations"
(para. 13 of her Affidavit). All of these are denied by Mr. M. What is more, the
separation agreement clearly says he is paying at a level almost two times that
of the New York child support standard for the support of his children, and he
provides a series of cancelled cheques, some endorsed by Ms M. and some payable
to third parties, which together he says meet his support obligations.
There is no evidence that Mr. M. has ever physically harmed his
children. On the issue of psychological harm, Ms M.'s affidavit draws a link
between Mr. M.'s conduct and his drinking, on the one hand, and L's bedwetting
on the other. These incidents predate separation, but furthermore her
explanations for L's "accidents" are inconsistent. In her reporting to Dr. Ellis
(whose narrative psychological assessment is filed on behalf of Ms M.) she
discloses L's most recent "accidents" since arriving in Manitoba are
attributable to the child not wanting to stop what she is doing or drinking too
late at night. She also describes to Dr. Ellis, L's "special relationship" with
her father; that "L felt close to him" and indicates the children had more
Equality time" following separation than before. These disclosures represent a
qualitative difference from the impressions left by her affidavit.
Given
the conflicting and inconsistent nature of the evidence, I can not conclude Ms
M. has proved Mr. M. poses a risk to the children. The Hague Convention
procedures are summary ones and except in the most unusual of circumstances are
based on affidavit evidence (see Thomson , supra ; and Szalas v. Szabo , (1995)
16 R.F.L. (4th) 168 (Ont.. Ct. of Justice)). At the same time, I must recognize
my ability to measure Mr. M.'s reporting is not as extensive as my ability to
measure Ms M.'s. Most importantly, I am unable to conclude Mr. M. is an equal or
better caretaker than Ms M. - a significant factor, as I turn to the single
allegation of "risk of harm" for which I am satisfied there is proof.
At
the heart of Ms M.'s case is the risk of psychological harm, particularly to LL,
the younger child. Dr. Ellis' report focuses on bonding and attachment issues.
He indicates it is unwise to disrupt a child's attachment with a primary
caregiver between the age of four months and three years. Problems in bonding
and attachment are the principal cause of personality disorders in adults and
adjustment problems in children. Any change in principal caretaking before a
final decision is reached on the best interests of these children is to be
avoided - particularly so, given his conclusions these children have been the
recipients of advantaged primary care to date. What is more, Mr. M.'s limited
contact combined with LL's age makes it a virtual certainty he is a stranger to
LL now.
Dr. Ellis indicates healthy and robust infants can survive the
trauma of disruption - "possible survival" being a test far removed from "best
interests". He says such children can reattach to new caretakers but this is
highly dependent upon the quality of the new or substitute caretaker. Should
children be exposed to less advantaged caretakers, there is a much increased
risk. The risk of maladaption increases exponentially from there, if the new
bond (which in this case would be one with Mr. M.) should be disrupted again in
the short to medium term (one month to two years). Such a "bouncing" could occur
if the New York order giving sole custody to Mr. M. were to remain in place, but
on a final determination, the mother resumes primary care. As Dr. Ellis
indicates at page 12 of his report:
There are risks inherent in any tampering with the original process of
bonding and attachment formation. Many survive and some do not. The consequences
to those that do not are profound and catastrophic. The chances of profound and
catastrophic consequences are not doubled by a further change in caretakers but
are increased many fold. For this reason, it is wise to give serious
consideration to the decision to disrupt an attachment, and weigh the
alternatives carefully in light of the risks inherent in any such decision, no
matter how wisely they are made nor how justified they seem at the time.
From Dr. Ellis' report I conclude these children have had the advantage
of strong primary caretaking and have a secure attachment to their mother.
Whether or not Mr. M.'s difficulty with alcohol exists, or renders him
incapable of caring for the children, the fact remains he was never a primary
care giver, and this, combined with his temporary custody order and the warrant
that may have issued, may result in the children's immediate removal from Ms
M.'s care upon her return. This in turn will expose LL to the risk of
psychological harm outlined by Dr. Ellis. Ms M. also points out that if she
returns to New York she has no home. no job. no reliable means of support and
lacks other supports there which she has here.
But she does not stop
there. Her trump card is this: her counsel indicates she will not return to New
York with the children. She is staying here. In consequence the grave risk of
harm will necessarily arise if a return order is made, or that at least is her
submission.
It is essential Ms M. understand that the Hague Convention
is not designed or intended to address the best interests of particular
children. Its purpose is to prevent the unilateral severance by one parent of
the other's relationship with their children, as well as the unilateral
selection of a forum most convenient to the departing parent without prior
assessment of the children's best interests. Where children are concerned,
possession cannot be 9/10ths of the law. The selection of L's and LL's residence
is a custody right which she does not hold alone. Whatever Mr. M. is or is not,
he is, for now, a custodial parent.
And what of Ms M.'s refusal? Counsel
for Mr. M. asks me to dismiss it as a specious proposition. She refers to the
comments of Butler-Sloss, L.J. in C. v. C. (minor, abduction; rights of custody
abroad) , [1989] 1 W.L.R. 654, [1989] 2 All E.R. 465 (C.A.)
The grave risk
of harm arises not from the return of the child, but the refusal of the mother
to accompany him. The convention does not require the court in this country to
consider the welfare of the child as paramount, but only to be satisfied as to
the grave risk of harm. I am not satisfied the child would be placed in an
intolerable situation if the mother refused to go back. In weighing up the
various factors, I must place in the balance and as of the greatest importance
the effect of the court refusing the application under the convention because of
the refusal of the mother to return for her own reasons. not for the sake of the
child. Is a parent to create the psychological situation, and then rely on it;
if the grave risk of psychological harm to a child is to be inflicted by the
conduct of the parent who abducted him, then it would be relied on by every
mother of a young child who removed him out of the jurisdiction and refused to
return. It would drive a coach and four through the convention, at least in
respect of applications relating to young children. (p. 471).
I decline
to conclude that there will never be a situation where a mother's refusal to
accompany her children will be successful in establishing a grave risk of harm.
I note, though, that such a refusal has not carried the day in any of the cases
to which I was referred (see Thomson ; re L. ; C. v. C ; Thorne ; supra ).
Nonetheless, as the Supreme Court stated in Young v. Young, [1993] 4 S.C.R. 3,
49 R.F.L. (3d) 117, and again confirmed in Thomson , supra (at 328 para. 81),
"from a child centred perspective, harm is harm".
The facts of this case
make Ms M.'s refusal to accompany the children untenable and unreasonable.
Unreasonable, because safety concerns for herself and the children are neither
proved, nor of the kind or degree set out in Pollastro v. Pollastro [1999] 45
R.F.L. (4th) 404 (Ont. C.A.). The test is a stringent one (see Thomson , supra
). If Mr. M. poses a risk to the children because his caretaking skills are poor
or because a bond with LL's mother may be broken, these can be managed by
ensuring the children remain in her primary care upon their return. Furthermore,
Ms M. has an obligation as a custodial parent to protect her children from
unreasonable risks (of which LL's unaccompanied return is one) and to minimize
any instability the children might experience (see Re A , supra � 375). All in
all, when the reasonableness of her refusal is viewed in light of the evidence I
have, and weighed in the balance with the policy objectives of the Convention,
Ms M.'s refusal cannot be sustained.
If she chooses instead to put her
own current comfort and her support network here first, she places in doubt both
her continuing role as a custodial parent, and her future candidacy as a sole
custodial parent in any proceedings in New York. She, more than most, knows from
experience how important family of origin and attachment issues are for
children. If her decision not to return to New York is truly genuine, only two
possibilities occur to me on the basis of the evidence before me:
a)She
is more concerned with herself than her children and is unreasonably prepared to
expose them to harm; or
b)Mr. M.'s parenting is not as deficient as she
otherwise indicates it to be.
Neither places her in a favourable light.
From the advantaged care Dr. Ellis describes these children having received, I
can not believe the first of these propositions is true.
Subjectively,
there are many reasons why a parent (in this case, Ms M.) would agree to joint
custody or even equal care and control yet quickly come to realize the situation
is hopeless in the long term. It may yet be that the long term best interests of
these children are served in the primary care of their mother in Manitoba. But
"best interests" is not, and can not be, the consideration for this court now. A
considerable period of time will pass, too, before the New York courts can
provide any final resolution. It is therefore essential these parents do now
what this court cannot - focus on their children's best interests. Dr. Ellis'
recommendations are written as much for the parties' sake as they are for the
court. He identifies serious concerns for the children's short and long term
well being. L is struggling with her parents' separation and the conflict
associated with it. This must end.
The parties should ask themselves now
what the evidence is really likely to reveal at a trial for sole custody. If Ms
M. can establish herself in New York as the sole custodial parent, Mr. M. ought
to recognize now that she may well be permitted to return to Manitoba. Reliable
and meaningful distance access ought, in that event, to be negotiated. If Ms M.
will not return, and if Mr. M. is indeed a capable parent, steps should be taken
now to transition the children and assure them of frequent and regular contact
with their mother pending trial or on a long term basis. Their interests are not
enhanced by conflict, uncertainty or the prospect of multiple moves with or
without Ms M. I beg each parent to reread Dr. Ellis' conclusions and
recommendations and consider subordinating their own immediate interests to
those of their children. A contest of wills is not going to serve these two
little girls very well.
MANAGING THE RISK:
My review of the case law leads me to conclude:
a)How Ms M. views the prospect of return and its tolerability, is not
the test, as important as the primary caregivers' state of mind may be in the
long term for the children (see P. v. P. (minors) (child abduction), [1992] 1
F.L.R. 155, [1992] Fam. Law 197, [1992] 1 F.C.R. 468 (H.C.)
b)Alcoholism, lack of financial support, confrontational and abusive
behaviour, even if proved, would not necessarily satisfy the "grave risk of
harm" test set out in Thomson , supra . (Finizio v. Scoppio Finizio [1999] O.J.
No. 3579 (Ont. C.A.) � 7 para. 37) (where mother was assaulted-return of
children nonetheless ordered); Parsons v. Styger [1989] 67 O.R. (2d) 1 (Ont.
S.C.)-(where threat to kill mother made by father-children still returned); B.
v. B. (abduction; custody rights), [1993] 2 All E.R. 144 [1993] Fam. 32 (C.A.)
(where inadequate housing/financial circumstances did not prevent return).
c)The circumstances of this case (but for the bonding issue) do not come
close to the gravity of risk mother and child were exposed to in Pollastro ,
supra , (a case where return was not ordered).
d)While courts have split
siblings, returning one child but not the other where there was evidence of harm
in respect of only one (see Chalkley v. Chalkley , (1994) 96 Man. R. (2d) 56
(Q.B.); varied on appeal (1995) RFL (4th) 442; leave refused [1995] SCCA No.
33), it would be imprudent to separate the children here, given their ages and
without further evidence from Dr. Ellis. Neither parent argued for this in any
event.
e)Courts invariably recognize economic needs of the children and
of the primary care giver upon a return (see Snetzko v. Snetzko [1996] 23 R.F.L.
(4th) 488 (Ont. Gen. Div.); Finizio , supra; re L. supra).
f)Courts
frequently are faced with the fact that a change in primary care giving might
occur as a result of a "chasing order" issued in the former jurisdiction.
Psychological harm to children may result by reason of the severance of that
primary caregiver relationship. Yet in all cases to which my attention was drawn
by counsel, the children have been ordered returned (see Thomson , supra ; re L.
(child abduction) (psychological harm), Re, [1993] 2 F.L.R. 401 (H.C.); re A. (a
minor) (abduction), Re, 18 Fam. Law 55, [1998] 1 R.F.L. 365 (C.A.); C. v. C. and
Thorne v. Dryden Hall [1995] 18 R.F.L. (4th) 15 (B.C.S.C.).
g)These same
courts have recognized that unqualified return orders can be detrimental to the
short term interests of children wrenching them from their primary caregiver. As
LaForest, J. indicated in Thomson , ( supra ):
Courts ... have deemed themselves entitled to require undertakings of the requesting party provided that such undertakings are made within the spirit of the convention ... [T]hrough the use of undertakings, the requirement in article 12 of the Convention that "the authority concerned shall order the return of the child forthwith" can be complied with, the wrongful actions of the removing party are not condoned. the long term best interests of the child are left for a determination by the court of the child's habitual residence, and any short term harm to the child is ameliorated. (p. 330, para. 84).
I am satisfied this is an appropriate case for undertakings, to ensure these
children will remain in the primary care of the mother, and so they will not be
exposed to unwarranted short term harm, or even an intolerable situation,
pending a full enquiry into their best interests by the New York court.
Undertakings have frequently been used as an effective tool to minimize
or control short term harm to a child, and most often these have been offered by
the parent seeking the return order. Such undertakings have included:
a)A return to the pre-abduction status quo in terms of time sharing with
the child so any disruption to the child upon return is avoided or minimized;
b)Provision of travel costs;
c)Payment of support (recognizing
an absconding parent, though acting wrongfully, will have economic needs that
must be met in the short term);
d)Provision for housing or exclusive
occupancy of the marital home;
e)A promise to refrain from enforcing
warrants, pursuing contempt proceedings or otherwise enforcing chasing orders
issued in the former jurisdiction; and
f)Provisions that neither party
molest, annoy or harass the other.
In some of the cases, courts have
gone further to supplement or dictate terms of undertakings - including
provisions for housing, a vehicle, household furnishings, school placement,
payment of support to the absconding parent, as well as restricting rights to
enforce or pursue interim applications designed to punish or control the
absconding parent. (See Snetzko ; Re L. ; and P. v. P. , supra ).
The
undertakings Mr. M. offers in the present case are less than precise. I adopt
the remarks of MacPherson, J.A. who indicated in Finizio ( supra ):
The strong language of the Convention ... will inevitably result in many children being returned to the country from which they have been wrongfully removed. Given that prospect, both counsel should be prepared to deal fully with the issue of how the children are to be returned, and to do so before the judge hearing the initial convention application. (para 37)
I have pieced together from Mr. M.'s material the following undertakings:
a)He is prepared to attend in Winnipeg to pick up the children should
they be ordered returned;
b)He acknowledges his present custody order in
New York is temporary, that a full hearing is required, and that if the mother
returns to New York, he would expect "daily access to [his] children and
extended access on weekends when [he] was not working" (para. 23 of his
affidavit sworn November 5, 1999).
c)He will do whatever is necessary to
prevent psychological harm to the children (see attachment to his APPLICATION
FOR ASSISTANCE UNDER THE HAGUE CONVENTION ON CHILD ABDUCTION, para. VII).
Finally, during the course of argument, counsel for the father, conceded
that Mr. M. could not very well object to an undertaking that arrears and
ongoing support should be paid if the children were returned. After all, it was
his position he provided proper support in the past; and nearly all of the cases
on which he relies specifically provide for support of children upon their
return. If the father's undertakings are formalized and appropriately
supplemented so that events in New York unfold with some degree of control, the
children (and particularly LL) can be appropriately insulated from any grave
risk of harm on their return.
I have concluded the only practical way to
resolve matters is to order the children's return to New York forthwith, and in
compliance with the provisions of the Convention. However, I will stay my order
on appropriate conditions to permit the mother a short time to reconsider her
position on accompanying the children. Should she not, undertakings are
unnecessary. Should she do so, she should also have time to make inquiries
respecting housing, child care, employment, legal advice and so on. The father,
during that same time ought to be taking steps to confirm and provide evidence
to this court or Ms M.'s counsel that satisfactory undertakings are in place.
Within the time frame provided, some of these undertakings can in fact be
completed.
It may yet be necessary for the parties to offer further
submissions on the details of my order or the appropriateness of undertakings,
or transitioning of the children. If so, and only if details can not otherwise
be resolved between them, counsel may obtain a return date before me on an
emergent basis. In such event, I reserve the right to modify, or supplement my
order, the stay, or its conditions. For now some guidance should be given on
what undertakings I consider appropriate on information now available. My order
therefore is as follows:
a)L and LL M. shall be returned to Horseheads,
New York forthwith and in any event by January 15, 2000.
b)The preceding
order is stayed until further order.
c)For the period of the stay:
(1) Ms M. will provide reasonable telephone access to the father at her
expense which access shall be unmonitored and shall be as frequent as once per
day. Failing agreement that access will be at 7:00 p.m. Winnipeg time for a
duration of 15 minutes. Should Mr. M. come to Winnipeg he shall have reasonable
periods of care and control with the children. To that extent. LL, in
particular, may require some reintroduction.
(2) Neither Ms M., Mr. M.
nor any other person shall remove the children from the City of Winnipeg during
the period of this stay, or until the undertakings have been satisfactorily
confirmed between counsel or confirmed before this court.
(3) Mr. M.
shall not consume alcohol six hours prior to any telephone access nor twelve
hours prior to or during any in person periods of care and control.
d)It
is my expectation that Ms M. will on or before Thursday, December 30, 1999
communicate to Mr. M. via counsel her intentions regarding return. Should she
elect not to accompany the children or fail to communicate her intentions, the
stay order may be lifted on application following which Mr. M. will be at
liberty to have the children delivered into his care. It is essential that
should this occur, the parties arrange an appropriate transition of the children
in consultation with a professional therapist to assist in the reintroduction of
the children, particularly LL, and the transitioning of care before Mr. M.
leaves Winnipeg. I fully expect this will require Mr. M. to spend several days
here. Arrangements for this should be made between counsel and if not agreed to,
will be provided for by this court after further submissions.
e)Should
Ms M. indicate she will accompany the children, the order remains stayed until
the following undertakings have been confirmed to this court, or otherwise are
satisfied between counsel. The undertakings which I consider reasonable on the
evidence now available and on my review of the case law are these:
(1)
Mr. M. will apply to the New York Family Court to vary the existing sole
temporary custody order to terms which reflect the status quo, and pending a
full hearing there. In this case, that is the wording of the separation
agreement i.e. "joint legal custody to the parties with physical custody to the
mother and liberal visitation to be agreed upon".
(2) The New York Order
may also provide for nonremoval of the children from New York by either parent
pending a final hearing.
(3) Mr. M. will confirm the warrant issued by
the Family Court has been cancelled and that he will not seek to further enforce
the temporary order, or the warrant.
(4) Mr. M. will provide prepaid
return transportation for the mother and children.
(5) Ms M. will have
immediate needs on her return and until employment is secured. Mr. M. should
provide a proposal as to how his ongoing support payments can be assured to be
regular, timely, and enforced. As well, one half of the support arrears which
have accumulated since May also ought to be paid to Ms M. to provide for the
children's immediate needs upon their return. Arrears presently amount to
approximately $10,000.00. One-half that sum should be paid to an attorney for Ms
M. in trust that it be released to her upon her return to New York with the
children.
(6) To the extent necessary, peace officers are authorized to
enforce the provisions of this order.
The time afforded Mr. M. by this
stay will permit him to confirm completion of his undertakings particularly the
modification of the New York order, thereby eliminating any need I might have to
be concerned with compliance. More than once courts have considered the
enforceability of undertakings (see comments of L'Heureux-Dube, and McLachlin,
J.J. (in dissent) in Thomson and the remarks of Waite, J. in P. v. P. , ( supra
)). Hopefully, this will also give Ms M. additional assurances the children will
not be removed from her care, without due process. I also recognize the support
requirement I impose does not take into account costs issues or any entitlement
Mr. M. might have to variation/remission of that obligation under New York law.
These can all be reserved to the New York court after all the evidence is heard.
The fact is Ms M. and the children will require appropriate financial measures
in place to obtain housing and to meet their fundamental needs until employment
can be secured.
Last, but not least, I am requesting that The Central
Authority forward a copy of these reasons to the court in New York for its
information. As a matter of comity, I hope that court will facilitate the
requisite undertakings which involve its orders. As well, I respectfully request
the New York court consider the possibility of expediting trial dates to permit
a "best interests" determination to be made for these children at the earliest
possible date.
LIST OF AUTHORITIES:
A. (a minor) (abduction), Re , 18 Fam. Law 55,
[1988] 1 R.F.L. 365 (C.A.)
B. v. B. (abduction; custody rights), [1993]
2 All E.R. 144 [1993] Fam. 32 (C.A.)
C. v. C. (minor; abduction; rights
of custody abroad), [1989] 1 W.L.R. 654, [1989] 2 All E.R. 465 (C.A.)
Chalkley v. Chalkley (1994) 96 Man. R. (2d) 56 (Q.B.); valid on appeal
(1995) ORFL (4th) 442; leave refused [1995] SCCA No. 33
Hawke v. Gamble
[1998] 43 R.F.L. (4th) 67 (B.C.S.C.)
Finizio v. Scoppio-Finizio [1999]
O.J. No. 3579 (Ont. C.A.)
Gordon v. Goertz [1996] 1 S.C.R. 27
L.
(child abduction) (psychological harm), Re , [1993] 2 F.L.R. 401 (H.C.)
P. v. P. (minors) (child abduction), [1992] 1 F.L.R. 155, [1992] Fam.
Law 197, [1992] 1 F.C.R. 468 (H.C.)
Parsons v. Styger [1989] 67 O.R.
(2d) 1 (Ont. S.C.)
Pollastro v. Pollastro [1999] 45 R.F.L. (4th) 404
(Ont. C.A.)
Rechsteiner v. Kendell (1998) 39 R.F.L. (4th) 127 (Ont.
G.D.F.C.); aff'd [1999] OJ No. 3929 (C.A.)
Snetzko v. Snetzko [1996] 23
R.F.L. (4th) 488 (Ont. Gen. Div.)
Szalas v. Szabo , (1995) 16 R.F.L.
(4th) 168 (Ont.. Ct. of Justice)
Thorne v. Dryden-Hall [1995] 18 R.F.L.
(4th) 15 (B.C.S.C.)
Thomson v. Thomson , [1994] 6 R.F.L. (4th) 290
(S.C.C.)
Trapp v. Trapp, 526 N.Y.S. (2nd) 95, 136 A.D.
(2nd) 178
W.(V) v. S.(D) [1996] 2 S.C.R. 108
Young v.
Young, [1993] 4 S.C.R. 31, 49 R.F.L. (3d) 117
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