http://www.incadat.com/ ref.: HC/E/UKe 172 [19/08/1992; High Court (England); First Instance] Re B. (Minors) (Abduction) (No. 1) [1993] 1 FLR 988 Reproduced with the express permission of the Royal Courts of Justice.
IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUSTICE
FAMILY DIVISION
Royal Courts of Justice
19 August 1992
Waite J.
In the Matter of re B.
Counsel: Jeremy Rosenblatt for the mother; Heather MacGregor for the father
WAITE J: At the outset of these proceedings under the Child Abduction and
Custody Act 1985, based upon a mother's contention that children habitually
resident in Germany have been retained unlawfully by their father in England, I
have to deal with an application which goes to the whole root of the
jurisdiction. The respondent father applies to stay or to dismiss the
proceedings as an abuse of the process of the court upon the ground that the
applicant mother, having entered an appearance to the father's divorce petition
in this country, and also to family proceedings started by him here in which she
has made a cross-application on her own behalf, cannot now be heard to avail
herself of the rights given by the Convention to parents of children who have
been unlawfully removed to or retained in another jurisdiction.
The
circumstances in which that application is made are briefly summarised as
follows. The parties, whom I will call the mother and the father, were married
in July 1988. Their two children, J and K, were born on 27 November 1988 and 27
April 1990 and are thus still very young. For a time the parents lived in
England and Scotland where the father had his own business. Signs that the
marriage was coming to grief became evident in September of last year, 1991,
when the mother took the children to Germany and stayed with them at her own
mother's house near Frankfurt. The father soon followed. The result may not have
amounted to a reconciliation, but it certainly led to an agreement, as a result
of which the whole family returned to the UK.
Arrangements were made for
the flat where they had lived in Glasgow to be sold. That was done by Christmas
of 1991 and in early or mid-January 1992 the family came to London. On 20
January 1992 the whole family moved to Germany. They had an uninterrupted stay
there, apart from a 2-week skiing holiday, and by July 1992 the mother had made
arrangements to obtain part-time work at a local kindergarten. On 19 July 1992
the family travelled to England. There is a conflict of evidence as to their
motives for so doing. The mother says it was merely in furtherance of an
intended 10-day holiday in this country, but the father contends that it was a
permanent return.
If the proceedings are allowed to continue that
conflict will have to be resolved. It is sufficient for present purposes to say
that almost immediately upon the return of the family to England, the father
took certain legal steps. On 22 July 1992 he obtained, ex parte, a prohibited
steps order against the mother, restraining the removal of the children from the
jurisdiction of the English court. That was granted upon a very short-term basis
only, on the father's undertaking to bring the matter back before the district
judge on an inter partes basis on 30 July 1992. On the same day, 22 July 1992,
the father presented a petition to the English court for dissolution of his
marriage to the mother. It was served upon her in this country on 23 July 1992
and on 27 July 1992 she entered an appearance in the prescribed form, which
included a statement that she did not intend to defend the suit so far as it
sought dissolution of the marriage, and added an intimation that she intended to
apply on her own account for a residence order in respect of the two children.
The father, meanwhile, had complied with his undertaking to present an
application inter partes and he launched on 22 July 1992 an application in the
family proceedings court, which meant at that stage the county court, claiming a
residence order in respect of the children and a prohibited steps order
restraining their removal by the mother. It will be convenient for brevity's
sake to call that 'the father's family proceedings application'.
I have
mentioned that the district judge who granted ex parte relief on 22 July 1992
had done so upon the basis that the matter would come back inter partes on 30
July 1992. So it did, and a very active day it proved to be for these parents on
the procedural front. First of all on that day, the mother, for her part, made
an application in family proceedings under s 10 of the Children Act 1989. In it
she claimed a residence order in these terms: 'I want the court to order that
both children should reside with me in Germany'. Her application included
particulars of the arrangements she proposed for the children if that order were
to be granted. I will call that proceeding 'the mother's family proceedings
application'.
It was made returnable before the district judge at the
same time and place as the father's family proceedings application. District
Judge Moorehouse was due to hear them both at 3.30 pm that afternoon. At 2
o'clock that same day the mother, through her counsel, made an application to
Bracewell J, who was sitting to deal with urgent ex parte applications. She
sought from her a peremptory declaration that the retention of the children in
England had been wrongful or unlawful within the terms of Art 3 of the Hague
Convention. The judge declined to grant her such relief upon an ex parte basis,
indicating that if such orders were to be applied for, the relevant application
should be made at a hearing at which the other party would have the opportunity
of being heard in opposition.
Having made that unsuccessful application
for ex parte relief, Mr Rosenblatt, the mother's counsel, joined Mrs MacGregor,
the father's counsel, at the appointment before District Judge Moorehouse at
3.30. Mr Rosenblatt informed the district judge, and his opponent, of the fact
that he had made an unsuccessful application for interim ex parte relief under
the Child Abduction and Custody Act 1985. There is some dispute, which
fortunately I do not find it necessary to resolve, between the recollections of
counsel as to whether or not he went further and stated that it was his client's
intention to go ahead and launch proceedings under the Child Abduction and
Custody Act 1985.
It seems that a sufficient degree of accord was
reached between the parties' representatives at the hearing before District
Judge Moorehouse for an order to be made by her by consent. First of all, she
directed that the father's family proceedings application and the mother's
family proceedings application both be transferred to the High Court. Time was
abridged for the filing of evidence. A court welfare officer's report was
ordered as to residence and removal of the children from the jurisdiction and
the ex parte prohibited steps order against the removal of the children from the
jurisdiction was continued until the hearing of the application. The date fixed
for the hearing of the applications, that is to say the father's family
proceedings application and the mother's family proceedings application, was 17
November 1992.
That does not, however, exhaust a description of all that
happened procedurally on that day, for on the same day, 30 July 1992, the mother
took out an originating summons under the Child Abduction and Custody Act 1985.
It seems to have been a hurriedly, and certainly a clumsily, drawn document
because it misdescribes the status of the parties as plaintiff and defendant
respectively, but in other respects it accorded with the normal form of
originating summons invoking the jurisdiction under the 1985 Act, and it sought
an order under the Convention for the peremptory return of the children to
resume their alleged habitual residence with the mother in Germany, contending
that they had been unlawfully retained here by the father.
That summons
was duly served and listed for hearing before myself. It is the summons which is
now the subject of Mrs MacGregor's application on the father's behalf for the
stay or dismissal to which I have already referred.
Mrs MacGregor, in
claiming on the father's behalf a stay or dismissal of the Hague Convention
proceedings, relies principally upon general principles of consistency and fair
play. By submitting to the matrimonial and family proceedings jurisdiction in
the way that she has, the mother -- so Mrs MacGregor submits -- has accepted the
jurisdiction of the English court as the appropriate forum to decide the future
both of her marriage and of her children. It would be wrong in principle and
unjust to the father, so it is urged, to allow the mother at one and the same
time to invoke the jurisdiction of the English court both for the purpose of
obtaining an order for the children's peremptory return under the Convention,
and for the purpose of having the issues as to their future residence and
relationship with their parents settled in the family proceedings in which she
and her husband are applicant and cross-applicant.
This argument, though
persuasively urged, is in my judgment fallacious because it overlooks the clear
distinction between the respective functions of the two jurisdictions. In family
proceedings the court is concerned to settle permanently, so far as permanence
is ever possible in proceedings of that kind, the role of the divided parents in
the future upbringing of their children, and specifically to decide with which
parent they are to reside and what degree of contact is to be afforded to the
other parent.
In Child Abduction and Custody Act 1985 proceedings, by
contrast, the court is concerned, in the interests of sparing children the
misery of being moved from one centre to another by parents hoping to secure a
tactical litigious advantage, to restore the status quo of the children's
habitual residence. An order under the Convention for the children's return to
the jurisdiction of the requesting State does not, however, in the least affect
the authority of the court of the requested State to deal with any issues of
residence or contact of which they may happen already to be seized or which may
be subsequently raised there by either parent. An order under the Convention for
the children's return to the jurisdiction of their habitual residence may
certainly, and often does, give rise to issues of forum conveniens as between
the courts of one jurisdiction or the other. Whenever that happens, a choice has
to be made between the competing claims of the two jurisdictions. The basis for
that selection is now well settled by the principle propounded in the House of
Lords in a series of authorities of which De Dampierre v De Dampierre [1988] AC
92, [1987] 2 FLR 300 is a recent example.
In making a selection between
one forum or the other as the court which is to decide the children's future,
the fact that the children happen to be physically located in one of the
competing jurisdictions is bound, of course, to be relevant and cannot be
overlooked. It is very far, however, from being conclusive. That can be
illustrated from the circumstances of the present case. If the Child Abduction
and Custody Act 1985 proceedings are allowed to stand and the mother is
successful in obtaining an order for the children's return to Germany, that will
not in the least prejudice or obstruct the future progress of the matrimonial
proceedings in this country, or the father's and mother's family proceedings
applications already on foot here. Administrative matters like court welfare
officers' reports can be arranged, as they frequently are these days, by
interviews conducted through international co-operation in either Germany or
England or both. Either parent would in that event (that is to say the success
of the mother's child abduction application) be entirely free to continue, or to
start afresh, family proceedings in either country. If the result was to bring
into play parallel sets of proceedings threatening a conflict of jurisdiction,
then the consequent issue of forum conveniens would have to be resolved in one
jurisdiction or the other by the means I have already mentioned.
There
is therefore nothing inconsistent, in my view, about the mother's decision at
one and the same time to take an active part in family proceedings in this
country, and to maintain the application under the Child Abduction and Custody
Act 1985. The father's application to stay or dismiss those proceedings is
therefore, in my view, misconceived and it will be dismissed.
I should
add one comment, in deference to the argument addressed to me by Mrs MacGregor.
The principles of equitable estoppel are often acclaimed as a high example of
the flexibility of English law. They are just as often deployed as a weapon of
last resort by a despairing advocate. I hope I do not do an injustice to Mrs
MacGregor's reliance upon estoppel in the present case by saying no more than
that in my view her argument falls firmly into the latter category.
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